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INTRODUCTION
Anonymity, often considered a cornerstone of democracy and a
First Amendment guarantee, is easier to attain than ever before due
to the recent emergence of cyberspace. Cyberspace' enables anyone
to communicate, via text, sound, or video, to hundreds or thousands
of other people, nearly instantaneously and at little or no cost. As of
July 2000, more than 143 million adults had access to cyberspace in
the United States,2 and over 359 million had access worldwide.'
Those numbers are growing rapidly. Due to the nature of the tech-
nology, identities in cyberspace are easily cloaked in anonymity.
Once a message sender's identity is anonymous, cyberspace pro-
vides to the masses the means to perpetrate widespread criminal
activity4 with little chance of apprehension.
Debate rages about how, and by whom, cyberspace and cyber-
anonymity should be governed.5 In a report to former Vice President
Al Gore, Attorney General Janet Reno found a need for greater
control of anonymous communication in cyberspace.6 Reacting to
several high-profile attacks on major e-commerce web sites,7 former
1. "Cyberspace" is generally considered to be a combination of the Internet, e-mail,
Bulletin Board systems, Internet Service Provider domains, etc. See Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-54 (1997).
2. The Nielsen//NetRatings Universe is defined as all members (2 years of age or
older) of U.S. which currently have access to the Internet. See Nielsen//NetRatings statistics
at the NUA Ltd. Homepage, available at http:lwww.nua.ie/surveys/howmany_.:online/
n_america.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2000)(on file with Michigan Telecommunications and
Technology Law Review (MTTLR)).
3. See NUA Ltd. Homepage, available at http:llvww.nua.ie/surveys/howv many-
online/world.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2000)(on file with MTTLR).
4. The low cost, ease of use, and potentially anonymous nature of cyberspace makes it
an attractive medium for fraudulent scams, child sexual exploitation, and "cyberstalking."
See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND INDUsTRY: A REPORT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT (August 1999), available
at http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crinminal/cybercrimelcyberstalking.htm (last modified Oct. 18,
1999) [hereinafter Attorney General] (on file with MTrLR).
5. "The FBI is constantly lobbying for so-called key-recovery features that could give
them access to a person's private key to unlock their encrypted data. Law enforcement and
powerful intellectual property owners-such as the record and music industries-don't want
Net users to be completely anonymous because obviously, that makes them harder to bust if
they are suspected of trafficking pirated material or committing other Net-based crimes."
Courtney Macavinta, New Product Guarantees Online Anonymity, CNET News.com
(December 13, 1999), available at http://www.cnet.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2000)(on file
with MTTLR).
6. See Attorney General supra note 4.
7. During the week of February 7, several major e-commerce web sites were the target
of "denial of service attacks" by hackers. These sites included, Yahoo, eBay, Amazon.com,
Buy.com, E*Trade, and CNN.com. They were temporarily crippled by the attacks, leaving
customers unable to access them. Evan Hansen & John Borland, New Assault Weapons Pose
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President Clinton underscored the opinion that the government
needs to maintain a watchful eye on cyberspace.8 On the other side
of the debate, some scholars see cyberspace as something that
requires, and is capable of creating, its own law and legal
institutions.9 Many in cyberspace, with the help of some purists,
0
have declared independence from all governmental control, and urge
a regime of guidelines and self-governance." Some factions promote
anarchy, and applaud when their anonymous Zorro figures commit
acts considered criminal by mainstream society, 2 while others
Threat to Web, CNET News.com (Feb. 8, 2000), available at http://www.cnet.com (last
visited Sept. 1, 2000)(on file with MTTLR).
8. President Clinton told CNN.com that the recent cyber-attacks on e-commerce
"underscore a need for the government to focus on protecting the Internet itself." Clinton
Taking Up Web Security with Experts, a Leading Hacker, A. P. INDEX (Feb. 15, 2000), at 1,
available at http://iwww.siliconvaey.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2000)(on file with MTTLR).
9. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1367 (1996); see also The Domain Name System: A Case
Study of the Significance of Norms to Internet Governance, 112 HAgv. L. REv. 1657, 1657
n.2. (1999).
10.
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come
from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the
past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty
where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you
with no greater authority than that which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the
global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies
you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess
any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.
We will spread ourselves across the Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts.
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, at
http://www.eft.org/-barlov/Declaration-Final.html (Feb. 8, 1996)(on file with MTILR).
II. See id.
12. Some web sites advocate cyber-anarchy, cyber-terrorism and e-commerce disrup-
tion. The Anarchist Action Network states three goals: 1) to counter defamation of anarchy
and anarchists in the media, 2) to foster cooperation, mutual aid, public space, compassion,
understanding, sharing, community-especially among young people who may not realize
alternatives to authoritarian control structures of the society into which they were born, and
3) to challenge the authority of all institutions and sources of coercion. Anarchist Action
Network, available at http:/www.zpub.com/notes/aadl.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2001).
The Hackers Homepage disclaimer states "We WILL NOT answer emails from anyone
asking about illegal activities, or how to use our products for illegal activities ... they will
automatically be deleted. All products [sold by the web site] are designed for testing and
exploring the vulnerabilities of CUSTOMER-OWNED equipment, and no illegal use is en-
couraged or implied. We WILL NOT knowingly sell to anyone with the intent of using our
products for illegal activities or uses. It is your responsibility to check with the applicable
laws of your city, state, or country." The Hackers Homepage, available at
2000-20011]
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attempt to provide controversial new services to the mainstream
public. 13
Despite the fact that no one sovereign controls cyberspace, it is not
an ungoverned and lawless frontier; many actions in cyberspace have
http://www.hackershomepage.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2001). However, some of the Inter-
net products available for sale at The Hackers Homepage site include:
Membership Sites Password Hacker: "Use this software to hack into most Internet sites
that use membership sign-on screens." The Hackers Homepage, available at
http://www.hackershomepage.com/section7.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2001).
H@tmail/Eud@ra Email Hacking: "Easy methods to hack into someone's
H@tmail/Eud@ra account and view their email." (Note that "Hotrnail" and "Eudora" are
purposely misspelled). Id.
Computer Pranks Collection: "This CD contains dozens of pranks that can be used to
annoy your victim. Pranks include: CD drive opening and closing, printer randomly printing,
windows moving about the screen, buttons moving before you can click on them with your
mouse, fake start menu, fake deletion of files and many more. Easy to install and will drive
your victim nuts. They'll be calling tech support thinking something is wrong with their
computer." Id.
Internet Site Ripper. "Have you ever found an Internet site that was too good to be true,
and you wanted to save everything on it to your hard disk? Well, this software does jut that.
It is a ripper and site scanner. It can also download, in many instances, areas of membership
protected sites that are usually impossible to view without paying a fee." Id.
Answering Machine Scanner/Hacker: "Use this device to access someone else's an-
swering machine. This device will scan all possible codes. Change someone else's messages,
change their access code, listen to their message, possibly gain access to free long distance
calling, etc. Works with most machines ... $100." The Hackers Homepage, available at
http://vww.hackershomepage.com/sectionl.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2001).
Pager Hacking & Bomber Software: "This CD is filled with texts and software pertain-
ing to hacking pagers. Learn to encode and decode Pagers. It contains several programs for
reprogramming most pagers. Several hardware interfaces are included. Also includes fre-
quencies, capcodes, passwords, universal programming adapter and discriminator pinpoints.
This complete collection contains everything you wanted to know on how to hack these
units. PAGER BOMBER: Use this software and your computer to activate all pagers within a
certain area code. All pagers will beep and display whatever number you entered. Imagine
the expression on the person's face when they receive thousands of calls asking the reason
for being paged. CD-ROM $125." Id.
GSM Cell Phone Hacking: "This CD contains everything currently available that can be
used to hack GSM digital and analog phones. Includes hard-to-find, experimental software
and texts for most phones. Nothing beats being able to call anyone you want for free." Id.
Of course, no self-respecting hacker would be caught without a File Shredder: "Includes
a 'panic button' that will delete all your sensitive files with the click of a button faster than
you can say 'search warrant.' Invaluable to businesses, hackers, and anyone with secrets,
skeletons, stored on their computer." The Hackers Homepage, available at
http://www.hackershomepage.com/section7.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2001).
13. For a more mainstream-oriented approach to anonymous mischief, PoisonPen.com
offers its customers "anonymous email services for ex-girlfriends, ex-boyfriends, disgruntled
employees, targets of unwanted sexual advances and ticked-off people everywhere." While
the company "strictly prohibits" profanity and vulgarity, it charges $8 to email anonymous,
"private, explicit words to the enemy." Evan Hansen, Start-up Sells Email Services to Re-
venge Seekers, CNET News.corn, Nov. 16, 1999, at 1, available at http://vww.cnet.com (last
visited Sept. 1, 2000)(on file with MTrLR).
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consequences in the real world.4 Some states have recently entered the
fray and taken matters into their own hands, legislating against ano-
nymity both in and out of cyberspace.'5 Even though cyberspace does
16 hvnot fit neatly into existing constitutional categories, courts have found
that these recent anti-anonymity statutes, regardless of whether they are
aimed at cyberspace, are too broad and violate the First Amendment. 7
The question of whether a state or the federal government can create
a narrowly tailored restriction on cyberspace anonymity without violat-
ing the First Amendment remains unresolved, however." The Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the issue, but it may soon consider the
constitutionality of criminalizing certain kinds of cyber-anonymity in
light of the unique nature of cyberspace. This comment explores the
various forms of anonymity, examines the First Amendment status of
anonymity in and outside of cyberspace, analyzes relevant scholarly
commentary, and concludes that a narrowly tailored legislative restric-
tion on "true" anonymity in cyberspace would not violate the First
Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
There are two different kinds of anonymity: true anonymity and
pseudo-anonymity. 9 Too often, scholars and court opinions fail to suffi-
ciently address this distinction. Dialogue on the issues of anonymity
legislation and First Amendment protection suffers on account of this
lack of distinction between true and pseudo-anonymity. This comment
will distinguish true and pseudo-anonymity, two completely different
forms of expression, with differing degrees of political and social value
and constitutional protection.
14. Companies often take action against anonymous abuses in cyberspace by trying to
unveil the identity of the abuser. "Online services in the United States have been flooded
with subpoenas demanding to unmask the identities of anonymous posters-a request that
companies sometimes honor." See Hansen, supra note 13.
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.
16. See Donald J. Karl, State Regulation of Anonymous Internet Use After ACLU of
Georgia v. Miller, 30 ARiz. ST. L.J. 513, 530 n.179 (1998); see generally Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (distinguishing the Internet from zoning precedents for adult movies and book-
stores, as well as precedents regarding broadcast media).
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.
18. "[W]hether a narrowly tailored Intemet anonymity restriction might pass constitu-
tional muster under the First Amendment remains an open question." See Karl, supra note
16, at 533.
19. Noah Levine, Establishing Legal Accountability for Anonymous Communication in
Cyberspace, 96 COLUaI. L. REv. 1526, 1528 n.9 (1996)(citing Mike Goodwin, Who Was That
Masked Man?, Internet World, Jan. 1995, at 22).
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A. True Anonymity
Truly anonymous communication is untraceable. Indeed, only coin-
cidence or purposeful self-exposure will bring the identity of the
mystery message sender to light; the identity of a person acting in a
truly anonymous manner can not be definitively discovered through any
amount of diligence. Attempts can be made to discover the identity of
the sender through inference, but any concrete trail of clues betraying
the message sender has been erased by circumstance, the passage of
time, or by the sender herself. Although some forms of truly anonymous
communication, such as political speech, are considered valuable, this
form of anonymity has exceptional potential for abuse because the mes-
sage senders cannot be held accountable for their actions.
B. Pseudo-Anonymity
Pseudo-anonymous communication, on the other hand, is inherently
traceable. Though the identity of the message sender may seem truly
anonymous because it is not easily uncovered or made readily available,
by definition it is possible to somehow discover the identity of a
pseudo-anonymous message sender. Pseudo-anonymity, has significant
social benefits;20 it enables citizens of a democracy to voice their opin-
ions without fear of retaliation against their personal reputations, but it
forces them to take ultimate responsibility for their actions should the
need somehow arise. Although governments could abuse their ability to
uncover the identity of people acting pseudo-anonymously, it is not in
the government's interest to break that trust; by respecting pseudo-
anonymous identities, governments can often avoid the far more dan-
gerous abuses stemming from true anonymity.
C. Anonymity Applied
Before cyberspace existed, anonymous communication was much
more expensive and time consuming.2' Nevertheless, concealed identi-
ties in communications are historically common.2 Pseudo-anonymous
communication was especially prevalent before and during the Ameri-
can Revolution, when it was common to use nicknames and codes when
sending letters.2' Truly anonymous communication in conventional me-
dia, however, was difficult to achieve, and only became more difficult
as technology progressed over the decades. Today, for a letter to be
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truly anonymous, the sender would have to keep the letter sterile and
devoid of fingerprints or other traceable materials such as regional dirt,
glue, paper, and ink.24 Additionally, individual typewriter keys leave a
unique, traceable signature, and postmarks force senders to travel great,
random distances to hide their origins. Untraceable phone calls have to
be brief and routed through numerous satellites (or made from an ob-
scure pay phone), and voices must be electronically cloaked. 2 True
anonymity before cyberspace, while attainable, required people to go to
great lengths and expense.
But all of that has changed. 6 The advent of cyberspace has vastly
increased communication on a global scale.27 Higher speed communica-
tion at minimal cost, combined with ever-improving technology, has
ushered in an era of easily accessible, truly anonymous communication.
Unique new forms of pseudo-anonymous communication have also de-
veloped. Citizens and legislatures alike have responded to these changes
with both well-founded and ill-founded beliefs and confusion.2 These
beliefs have recently begun to clash, leading to showdowns in the real
world, in cyberspace, and in courtrooms. These conflicts are discussed
below.
There are many different ways to communicate in cyberspace, 29 and
hence many ways to communicate anonymously. On one level of inter-
action, individuals can assume pseudonyms, enter virtual "chat rooms,"
and converse with others on nearly any subject. On another level of in-
teraction, individuals can create and view web pages. The identities of
the people engaged in these forms of communication are not always
24. Levine, supra note 19, at 1528.
25. Id.
26. Cf. NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 4-5 (1995)(discussing the move away
from communications employing physical objects towards completely digital communica-
tions media).
27. "As Moore's Law (the assertion that every eighteen months, processing power dou-
bles while cost holds constant) continues its relentless journey into the realm of smaller,
cheaper, and faster, the acceleration. of new technology introductions will increase. As it
does, Metcalf's Law (the assertion that the more people who use your software, your net-
work, your standard, your game, or your book, the more valuable it becomes, and the more
new users it will attract, increasing both its utility and the speed of its adoption by still more
users) is there to spread them around." LARRY DowNEs, UNLEASHING THE KILLER APP 21-28
(1998).
28. "The anonymity question is further muddied by a great deal of confusion about what
constitutes privacy in electronic communication. The agitation regarding the use of high
levels of cryptography to protect the 'privacy' of electronic messages should not be confused
with the question of true anonymity of message sources." Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonym-
it.; Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104
YALE L.J. 1639, 1675 (1995).
29. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 855, 851 (1997).
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easy to discover. However, changes in the technology that control cy-
berspace can effectively eradicate some forms of truly anonymous
communication." For example, the implementation of Internet Protocol
version 6 ("IPv6") would improve the ability of law enforcement to
track cyberspace communication through unique identifiers attached to
every computer's IP number.
Anonymous communication can be conducted through "anonymous
remailers."33 An anonymous remailer is a service that receives an email,
strips it completely of the true sender's identifying information, and
forwards the message to the email address specified by the sender. With
some experience, a person can use anonymous remailers to send un-
traceable, truly anonymous messages. 4
Most remailers do not keep records of the identities of the people
using their service. Ones that do are not used by people intending to
send truly anonymous messages, because any record of their identity
would leave a traceable path, thereby rendering their message only
pseudo-anonymous. As this comment will discuss below, there is a dis-
incentive for anonymous remailers to keep records of the identities of
their users.35 This disincentive only perpetuates the problems stemming
from truly anonymous email. Governments, on the other hand, have an
incentive to make all anonymous remailers keep records, thereby trans-
forming them into merely pseudo-anonymous communication devices.
Although anonymous remailers constitute the bulk of truly anony-
mous communication in cyberspace, there are other ways to achieve
true anonymity. Accounts on Internet email services, such as Hot-
mail.com or USA.net are available to anyone for free upon request.
Although these services ask for the user's name and address, this infor-
30. People take nicknames in Internet chat rooms to protect their identity from others in
the room. Although the host of a chat room usually has access to their real identities, this
information can be falsified. Likewise, although all WWW page domains must be registered
to a paying individual or company, several services (such as Tripod.com) exist that provide
free WWW pages in exchange for (easily falsified) personal information.
31. Not only is it socially undesirable, but it is technologically impossible to eradicate
all truly anonymous communication. Recent anonymous attacks on e-commerce sites are
considered to be "part of the price of the success of the Internet." Web Security, supra note
8. Additionally, "most analysts predict that such attacks will become a fixture of the digital
landscape." Hansen & Borland, supra note 7.
32. See Courtney Macavinta, Internet Protocol Proposal Raises Privacy Concerns, Cnet
News.com, (Oct. 14, 1999), available at http:llnews.cnet.comlnewslO-1005-200-852235.html
(last visited January 15, 2001)(on file with MT=LR); see also Domain Name System, supra
note 9.
33. As of November 4, 1999, there were 20 remailers up and running. See Ralph
Levien, Remailer List, available at http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/-raph/remailer-list.html (last
visited November 4, 1999)(on file with MTTLR).
34. See Attorney General, supra note 4.
35. Levine, supra note 19, at 1557.
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mation is rarely verified. 6 Therefore, any message sent is only traceable
to the computer that sent it. Anyone accessing the Internet from a public
terminal (assuming they are not recognized or later identified visually),
can keep his or her true identity a secret. Public Internet connections are
easy to find: many libraries and sidewalk cyberspace cafes offer Internet
access.
Despite the fact that truly anonymous messages can be sent without
the use of an anonymous remailer, anonymous remailers pose the great-
est problem for legal control. Although anti-remailer legislation might
shut down some poorly funded basement hackers, the world-wide nature
of cyberspace allows dedicated truly anonymous remailers to function
as advertised, because the remailer operators can avoid legislation by
moving outside the jurisdiction.37
D. First Amendment
1. Historically
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in part
that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .... ."" The Amendment "was designed to prevent the
majority, through acts of Congress, from silencing those who would
express unpopular or unconventional views."39 The Amendment's pur-
pose is to encourage formation of public forums into which messages
may be inserted without censorship./ Although most courts and com-
mentators agree that protecting freedom of speech is important to
fostering the marketplace of ideas,41 practitioners also recognize that the
First Amendment does allow some regulation that may limit free
36. See Attorney General, supra note 4.
37. This has already happened. On December 13, 1999, Zero-Knowledge Systems in-
troduced a Montreal, Canada-based anonymous remailer called "Freedom," "for those who
want to troll the Net incognito." "With Freedom, users' online activities are encrypted and
routed through a globally distributed network of servers that make it impossible to know
where users are physically located or who they really are. To ensure that people's actual
identities are not linked to their Freedom pseudonyms, they will buy $10 tokens and cash
them in for nyms. So all Zero-Knowledge ever knows about a person is that he or she pur-
chased a token, according to the company. 'Zero-Knowledge has no data that can be used to
compromise a user's privacy,' said Austin Hill, the company's president." Macavinta, supra
note 5. Hill is "not worried" about possible legal problems: "We're not exporting or building
encryption [from within] the United States ... We took an active stance to educate law en-
forcement [such as] the Department of Justice. Generally the conversation is 'can you build a
backdoor?' and we say 'No."' See id.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
39. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(mem.).
40. Branscomb, supra note 28, at 1676.
41. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
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speech.42 In other words, the Amendment does not guarantee individuals
the right to say whatever they want without accountability in all cases.
2. Relationship with Anonymity
Anonymity has historically been recognized as valuable for free
speech.43 Indeed, Justice Black noted that "[p]ersecuted groups and sects
from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppres-
sive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." 44 Black went
on to remind us that "even the arguments favoring the ratification of the
Constitution advanced in the Federalist Papers were published under
fictitious names."'45
Most historical political examples, however, relate to communica-
tion of a merely pseudo-anonymous nature. The identity of an author
employing a pseudonym is usually known to at least a select few, such
as an editor or publisher, and can be traced to the author if abused or if
otherwise absolutely necessary. For this reason, pseudo-anonymous
communication is relatively safe for society, and exceptionally valuable
to the perpetuation of the ideals of free speech. Truly anonymous com-
munication, on the other hand, is far more prone to abuse, and therefore,
is ultimately more dangerous.
3. In Cyberspace
The low cost of operating in cyberspace enables people sending
truly anonymous messages to operate on a scale never before possible."
The adage that freedom of the press is limited to those who owned one,47
or those who are willing to stand on a soapbox and yell, no longer ap-
plies. Now, "in the medium of cyberspace anyone can build a soap box
out of web pages and speak her mind in the virtual village green to an
audience larger and more diverse than any the Framers could have
imagined.
48
42. See Attorney General, supra note 4.
43. Mark Twain (Samuel Langhorne Clemens), 0. Henry (William Sydney Porter),
Voltaire (Francois Marie Arouet), George Sand (Amandine Aurore Lucie Dupin), George
Eliot (Mary Ann Evans), Charles Lamb (sometimes wrote as "Elia"), Charles Dickens
(sometimes wrote as "Boz"), and Benjamin Franklin (employed numerous different pseudo-
nyms) all cloaked their identities with various levels of anonymity. McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 n.4 (1995).
44. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960), quoted in McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
45. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65, quoted in McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
46. DOWNES, supra note 27, at 5.
47. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
48. Id.
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Additionally, there will always be a way to send anonymous com-
munication in cyberspace. No legislature is capable of physically
preventing a dedicated individual from communicating in a truly
anonymous form. This fact, however, has hardly prevented governments
from trying to criminalize true anonymity in cyberspace.
I1. CURRENT STATUS OF ANONYMITY REGULATION
Freedom has its consequences. Because attaining true anonymity in
cyberspace is relatively easy, the medium is prone to abuse. Abuses of
anonymity lead to increased costs for individuals, businesses, courts,
and society, and unsurprisingly, legislatures have begun to respond.
49
A. Statutes Criminalizing Cyberspace Anonymity
Historically, legislative attempts to criminalize anonymity have met
with varying degrees of success. Anti-anonymity legislation targeted at
cyberspace has been particularly unsuccessful, due to the general First
Amendment protections on free speech. Legislators and government
officials ignorant of the day-to-day fundamentals of the Internet too of-
ten overreact to perceived cyber threats stemming from the unique and
still undefined long-term nature of cyberspace.'0 As a result of this over-
broad criminalization of protected forms of speech, recent anti-
anonymity statutes have failed.5
1. Attorney General Report
The Attorney General's August 1999 report on cyberstalking recog-
nized the possible dangers stemming from true anonymity. 2 Although
the report recommended that legislatures create statutes addressing the
problems of true anonymity, it failed to offer specifics regarding exactly
49. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Supreme Court Rules: Cyber-
space Will be Free! ACLU Hails Victory in Internet Censorship Challenge, available at
http://vww.aclu.org/news/nO62697a.html (June 26, 1997). Although ACLU v. Miller and
American Liberty Association v. Pataki were the first challenges to state attempts to regulate
cyberspace, currently more than 20 states have passed or are considering passing laws that
regulate cyberspace. See id.
50. "The threat of an 'electronic Pearl Harbor' was raised in March 1999 by then-
Deputy Defense Secretary John Harare, who predicted in congressional testimony that cy-
berterrorists would target America's commercial interests." Web Security, supra note 8. In
response, President Clinton stated on February 15, 2000 that the major e-commerce attacks
of the week before "were a source of concern," but were not "an electronic Pearl Harbor."
Id.
51. See discussion infra Parts II.A.ii, II.A.iii.
52. See Attorney General, supra note 4.
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how to word such a statute." In the end, the report recommended that
federal law be amended "to make it easier to track down stalkers and
other criminals in cyberspace while maintaining safeguards for pri-
vacy," but its specific prescription included only an amendment to the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984."
2. American Civil Liberties Union v. Miller
In 1996, the legislature of the state of Georgia passed a statute spe-
cifically aimed at combating anonymity in cyberspace by an
overwhelming margin.55 Georgia insisted, when pressed, that the legis-
lation did not impose unconstitutional content-based restrictions on the
right to communicate anonymously.56 Instead, Georgia claimed that the
legislation only forbade "fraudulent transmissions or the appropriation
of the identity of another person or entity for some improper purpose." 7
The bill's sponsor claimed that the legislation did not apply to
"fictitious or pen names or anonymous communications on the Internet
. ., 58 The District Court of Georgia found that this was "over-broad and
threatened irreparable harm to the plaintiffs from continued self-
censorship."5 The Court found that the law criminalized both truly
anonymous and pseudo-anonymous communication in cyberspace.0
53. See id. ("Care must be taken in drafting cyberstalking statutes to ensure that they are
not so broad that they risk chilling constitutionally protected speech, such as political protest
and other legitimate conduct.").
54. As more and more people begin using their cable connections to gain access to cy-
berspace, the Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) may limit the ability of law
enforcement agencies to track down stalkers and other criminals acting anonymously in
cyberspace because the CCPA prohibits the disclosure of cable subscriber records to law
enforcement agencies without a court order and advance notice to the subscriber. See id.; see
also 47 U.S.C. §§ 551(c), (h) (2000).
On the other hand, Lawrence Lessig noted that some cable television companies offering
high speed Internet access have attempted to deny competing Internet Service Providers
access to their cable networks. Steve Lohr, Policing the Internet: Anyone But Government,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, § 4 (Week in Review) at 3. This could theoretically force the
Internet users on that network to give up all forms of true anonymity.
55. See Karl, supra note 16, at 517 (referring to Act No. 1029, 1996 Ga. Laws 1505-06,
codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (1996)).
56. ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
57. Id.
58. Karl, supra note 16, at 522 (quoting Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For
Preliminary Injunction, ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997)(No.
Civ.A.1: 96(V2475MHS), available at http://vvw.inteliview.com/aclupbi.txt)).
59. Karl, supra note 16, at 527; see also ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp at 1235
(enjoining Georgia from enforcing the anti-anonymity act).
60. The Georgia law provides that it is illegal for any person to knowingly transmit data
through a computer network if that data uses individual names, trade names, registered
trademarks, logos, official seals, or copyrighted symbols to falsely identify the person or
entity sending the data. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (a) (Harrison Supp. 1997).
The Criminalization of True Anonymity
3. Decency Regulation
Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is known as the
"Communications Decency Act of 1996."61 The purported goal of the
law was to regulate the access of minors to "indecent" and "patently
offensive" speech in cyberspace.62 The law was very hard to implement
without infringing on constitutionally protected speech, due to the na-
ture of the technology controlling cyberspace. Because "[a] child with
minimal knowledge of a computer, the ability to operate a browser, and
the skill to type a few simple words [such as 'dollhouse' or 'toys'] may
be able to access sexual images and content over the World Wide
Web,"6'3 the Communications Decency Act required people transmitting
any content in cyberspace to verify the age and identity of all potential
recipients of "indecent" material.6 Opponents of the law claimed that
the Act violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech,
because it "would have destroyed the anonymity that is a hallmark of
online communications." 65 In its first opinion involving cyberspace,o the
Supreme Court ruled that the online censorship provisions of the Com-
munications Decency Act were unconstitutional.
A New York case, American Library Ass'n v. Pataki,67' addressed a
state law similar to the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996.68
However, the issues raised in that case very closely parallel those raised
in ACLU v. Miller 9 The New York legislature attempted to criminalize
all cyberspace communication deemed "harmful" to minors. 0 The
plaintiffs in the case complained that the New York law unconstitution-
ally infringed their First Amendment rights.1 The Southern District of
New York struck down the law and ruled that it violated the Commerce
Clause, without reaching the First Amendment issues.7' Nevertheless,
61. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997).
62. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
63. Id.
64. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844; see also, Electronic Privacy Information Center,
EPIC Hails Supreme Court Internet "Indecency" decision: Opinion "Preserves Both Free
Speech and Personal Privacy" available at http://www2.epic.org/cda/epicsup-
ct_statement.html (June 26, 1997) (on file with MTTLR)
65. See EPIC, supra note 64.
66. See id.
67. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
68. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
69. See Karl, supra note 16, at 534.
70. The legislature criminalized any cyberspace communication that "in whole or in
part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and
which is harmful to minors." Id. (quoting American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
at 163 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 235.21(3)(1996)).
71. See Karl, supra note 16, at 534.
72. Id.
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free-speech advocates hailed the outcome of the case as a victory. Ann
Beeson, an ACLU national staff attorney who argued the case before
Judge Preska, declared that the Pataki and Miller decisions meant that
"whatever limits the Supreme Court sets on Congress's power to regu-
late the Internet, states are prohibited from acting to censor online
expression. 73 While it is true that state legislators have had no further
success in regulating cyberspace, Ms. Beeson's statement fails to take
into account the possibility that a narrowly tailored anonymity restric-
tion might survive First Amendment scrutiny.
B. Supreme Court Stance on Cyberspace Anonymity
Although the Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to con-
sider a narrowly tailored statute restricting cyberspace anonymity, 74 the
expanding nature of cyberspace may present the Court with an anonym-
ity-rights question in the near future. The Court has, however,
commented on the nature of communication in cyberspace. In its opin-
ion striking down the Communications Decency Act, the Supreme
Court noted that cyberspace constitutes "a unique and wholly new me-
dium of worldwide human communication ... located in no particular
geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world."'75
Additionally, it noted that cyberspace "can hardly be considered a
'scarce' expressive commodity" because it provides "relatively unlim-
ited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds."'76 "Scarce"
expressive commodities, such as radio and television frequencies, have
limited bandwidth77 and are therefore subject to stricter government
regulation.
Proponents of the Communications Decency Act claimed that it
would protect children while promoting cyberspace expansion.7" The
Supreme Court did not agree; it found that the Communications De-
cency Act "lack[ed] the precision that the First Amendment requires
when a statute regulates the content of speech," and therefore acted as a
hindrance on the desired expansion of cyberspace communication.79 The
Court declared that as "a matter of constitutional tradition, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, we should presume that governmental
73. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, New York Judge Prohibits State
Regulation of Internet, available at http://www.aclu.org/news/n062097c.html (June 20,
1997) (on file with MT'LR).
74. See Karl, supra note 16, at 533.
75. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850-51 (1997).
76. Id. at 870.
77. NEGROPONTE, supra note 26, at 23-24.
78. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 885.
79. Id. at 874.
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regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the
free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.""0 Based upon the Supreme
Court's current sentiment, for any future legislation restricting cyber-
space anonymity to have a chance of passing the Court's First
Amendment scrutiny, the legislation must be very narrowly tailored,
focused on specific problem areas, and non-detrimental to the expansion
of the medium.
C. Anonymity Outside of Cyberspace
Courts consider cyberspace unfamiliar territory that does not fit
neatly into existing constitutional categories, and when applying ano-
nymity law, the courts will often turn to analogy.8 If and when a
narrowly tailored cyberspace anonymity restriction faces the Supreme
Court, the Court will likely examine the protections of anonymity out-
side of cyberspace, such as political speech.
Historically, it seems that courts regard pseudo-anonymous com-
munication as relatively safe and highly valued, and, therefore, highly
protected under the First Amendment.8 On the other hand, courts have
not protected truly anonymous communication from legislative attacks
unless there are compelling reasons at stake, such as when the commu-
nication constitutes political speech.83 Court opinions do not always
make these distinctions as clear as possible, however. When courts pro-
tect anonymous speech under the First Amendment, they often combine
the concepts of true anonymity and pseudo-anonymity in their opinions
without acknowledging it. A confused, misleading or ambiguous opin-
ion only adds confusion to the discussion of anonymity regulation.
For example, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, a case that
has come to stand as the backbone for modem First Amendment pro-
tection of true anonymity, the Supreme Court ruled that Ohio's statutory
prohibition against distribution of any anonymous campaign literature
violated the First Amendment. 4 The Ohio statute at issue in the case
declared that:
"No person shall write, print, post, or distribute... any ... form of
general publication which is designed to ... promote the adoption
or defeat of any issue.., unless there appears on such form of pub-
lication in a conspicuous place or is contained within said statement
80. Id. at 885.
81. See Karl, supra note 16, at 530.
82. See infra Part II.
83. See infra Part IL
84. See McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334,357 (1995).
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the name and residence ... [of] the person who issues, makes, or is
responsible therefore." 85
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre, her son, and a friend dis-
tributed leaflets that were made on her home computer." The leaflets
discussed a proposed school levy tax, and many were signed
"CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS."87 The Ohio Election
Commission found that Mrs. McIntyre's distribution of unsigned leaf-
lets violated § 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code, and imposed a fine of
$100.88
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed McIntyre's fine, but the United
States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Ohio statute violated the
First Amendment." The Court expounded on the historical importance
of political anonymity: "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and
even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.""0
The Court declared that "the interest in having anonymous works enter
the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest
in requiring disclosure [of identity] as a condition of entry."'"
The Court then drew an inappropriate analogy from a nonpolitical
context: the pervasive practice of grading law school examination pa-
pers "blindly," "i.e., under a system in which the professor does not
know whose paper she is grading."' This example is misleading, be-
cause the case relates to true anonymity, but the example is one of
pseudo-anonymity. Although this example is dicta, it reflects the
Court's reasoning patterns and stands as a good indication of how the
distinction between true anonymity and pseudo-anonymity is easily
overlooked by judges and lawmakers. The Court's law school example
is one of pseudo-anonymity, not one of true anonymity, because the
identity of the student is discoverable; the law school administration
knows which exam belongs to which student. Indeed, after the professor
grades the exam, the system matches the grade with the student's iden-
tity. In McIntyre, the Court recognized via this example that pseudo-
anonymity is a very valuable and desirable form of communication
protected by the First Amendment, but the Court failed to recognize that
85. Id. at 338 n.3.
86. Id. at 337.
87. Id.
88. /d at 338.
89. McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334, 339, 357 (1995).
90. Id. at341.
91. The opinion went on to state, "Accordingly, an author's decision to remain anony-
mous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication,
is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 342.
92. Id. at 342 n.5.
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this example is misleading when offered in a case relating to true ano-
nymity. Instead of offering this blind grading example, the Court should
have offered an example of true anonymity to bolster its argument that
handing out anonymous political leaflets is constitutional.
The Court's holding regarding true anonymity, illustrated in the
opinion's somewhat misleading but nevertheless compelling footnote
6," is that political speech is valuable and worth protecting, even if it is
truly anonymous.94 Regardless of the confusing examples contained in
the opinion, McIntyre stands for Constitutionally protected truly
anonymous communication.95
1. Limits of True Anonymity Protection
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in McIntyre v. Ohio, not all
forms of truly anonymous political communication are protected under
the First Amendment. A couple of states have successfully outlawed
masks and disguises in attempts to legislate against and control the Ku
Klux Klan.96 The legislature in Fredericksburg, Virginia successfully
criminalized "wearing any mask, hood or other device.., so as to con-
ceal the identity of the wearer, to be or appear in any public place."97
The legislature of Georgia confronted "the dangers to society posed by
anonymous vigilante organizations" when it passed a similar statute
prohibiting the "wear[ing] a mask, hood, or device ... to conceal the
identity of the wearer" in public.98 The Georgia Supreme Court drew a
93. Footnote 6 of McIntyre reads:
"That tradition [of true anonymity with respect to political speech] is most famously
embodied in the Federalist Papers, authored by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and
John Jay, but signed 'Publius.' Publius' opponents, the Anti-Federalists, also tended to pub-
lish under pseudonyms: prominent among them were 'Cato,' believed to be New York
Governor George Clinton; 'Centinel,' probably Samuel Bryan ... ; 'The Federal Farmer,'
who may have been Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia member of the Continental Congress and
a signer of the Declaration of Independence; and 'Brutus,' who may have been Robert Yates,
a New York Supreme Court Justice who walked out of the Constitutional Convention. A
Forerunner of all of these writers was the pre-Revolutionary War English pamphleteer
'Junius,' whose true identity remains a mystery. The 'Letters of Junius' were 'widely re-
printed in colonial newspapers and lent considerable support to the revolutionary cause.'"
Id. at 343 n.6 (citations omitted).
Although this footnote illustrates the value of anonymity, the content of this footnote is
misleading because it does not distinguish between the pseudo-anonymous identities of the
Federalist Papers authors and the truly anonymous identities of some Anti-Federalists.
94. Id. at 341.
95. See ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
96. See Karl, supra note 16, at 531 n.187.
97. See id. at 531-32 (quoting Hernandez v. Superintendent, 800 F. Supp. 1344, 1346
n.l (E.D. Va. 1992) which held that a mask that is not a necessary part of an identifying
costume is not protected symbolic speech).
98. See id. at 533-34 (quoting State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 549 (Ga. 1990)).
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line through anonymity rights, and declared, "when individuals engage
in intimidating or threatening mask-wearing behavior, their interest in
maintaining their anonymity ... must give way to the weighty interests
of the State."' In Georgia, at least, a line exists between forms of valu-
able true anonymity that courts protect, and true anonymity that can be
legislated against.
III. ANALYSIS: THE SUPREME COURT WILL UPHOLD CERTAIN
STATUTES THAT CRIMINALIZE ANONYMITY IN CYBERSPACE.
Despite the fact that truly anonymous political communication is
generally protected under the First Amendment, it is possible for legis-
lators to create sufficiently narrow statutes targeting anonymity that
pass constitutional scrutiny. As discussed above, depending on how
compelling the interests at stake are,'°° states can legislate against some
forms of true anonymity such as Ku Klux Klan masks, but not other
forms, such as unsigned political leaflets. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court may allow further restrictions on cyberspace anonymity if the
restrictions are limited, target specific evils, and do not burden valuable
forms of anonymity, such as truly anonymous political speech and most
forms of pseudo-anonymous speech. Commentators are divided, how-
ever, on how the restrictions might be crafted.
A. Evaluation of Leading Commentators
Several scholars have addressed forms of anonymity in cyberspace,
and each has their own conclusions and recommendations. This com-
ment analyzes the various proposals relevant to the discussion, and then
outlines its own proposal.
1. Attorney General's Report
In her report to former Vice President Gore,'' Attorney General
Reno recognized some of the problems that arise from abuses of true
anonymity in cyberspace. However, despite its claim to the contrary, 2
the report gave no solid solution or recommendation as to how to crimi-
99. See id. at 533 (quoting State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 553).
100. See id.
101. See Attorney General, supra note 4.
102. The "anonymous nature [of cyberspace] make[s] it an attractive medium for
fraudulent scams, child sexual exploitation, and increasingly, a new concern known as
'cyberstalking.' [Tihis report ... provides recommendations on how to improve efforts to
combat this growing problem." Id.
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nalize abusive anonymous cyberspace communication. 3 The report
simply urged legislators to take "care" when drafting anti-cyberstalking
statutes that criminalized forms of anonymous communication, because
a "carefully drafted statute can provide broad protections against cyber-
stalking without running afoul of the First Amendment."'" This report is
useful only insofar as it alerts legislators to the growing problem of
anonymous abuses.
2. Trotter Hardy's Proposal
Professor Trotter Hardy poses perhaps the most significant argu-
ment 5 in the legal literature for a total statutory ban on anonymous
remailers in cyberspace.' 6 Professor Hardy recognizes that the vast
majority of truly anonymous communication in cyberspace arrives from
anonymous remailers, and he concludes that "the only effective deter-
rent to the problems of anonymous remailers will be to prohibit them
altogether."'0 7 He concedes that the case for imposing strict liability on
the system administrator of the anonymous remailer, instead of shutting
it down altogether, is strong.' 5 However, he declares that in the end, the
"rather drastic solution" of complete prohibition of anonymous remail-
ers is the only solution."
Professor Hardy's solution to fight abuses of anonymous communi-
cation in cyberspace by prohibiting anonymous remailers will fail for
several reasons. First, although anonymous remailers constitute the bulk
of truly anonymous communication in cyberspace, there are other ways
to send anonymous messages."' Therefore, truly anonymous communi-
cation from a different source will undermine any success of his
proposal.
Second, his proposal might not pass constitutional scrutiny: some
anonymous remailers are really only pseudo-anonymous because they
keep a record of the address of each message sender,"' and therefore
enjoy a heightened level of constitutional protection.
Third, while Professor Hardy correctly recognizes that anonymous
remailers can operate from anywhere on earth, his solution to the
103. See supra Part .A.i.
104. See Attorney General, supra note 4.
105. Levine, supra note 19, at 1540.
106. See Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993, 1051 (1994).
107. Id. at 1051.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See supra Part I.C.
111. Levine, supra note 19, at 1532.
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problem of jurisdictional issues is flawed. He states that because of "the
ease with which messages in cyberspace may be routed across national
borders, some form of international cooperation, such as a treaty, will be
necessary for the prohibition to be effective."' . He fails to recognize,
however, that as long as there exists one spot on earth where there is no
international treaty (and perhaps even in places where there is a
treaty),"' anonymous remailers will be able to operate."
4
3. Noah Levine's Proposal
Like Professor Hardy, Noah Levine recognizes that anonymous re-
mailers are being abused for criminal purposes."5 Levine agrees that
Professor Hardy's proposal is too extreme, and that it raises First
Amendment problems."6 Levine attempts to solve the anonymity abuse
problem by "ensuring that there is nearly always a party against which
an injured party may seek legal redress."".7 Levine contends that "the
best means for achieving such reform is by subjecting remailer admin-
istrators to liability for the illegal acts of their users in those
circumstances where responsible administration would have prevented
the acts in the first place."".. Levine's proposal urges that a "simple stat-
ute" be passed requiring remailers to keep records of sender identities,"9
and providing a safe harbor provision in order to encourage remailer
participation. 120 Remailers "would be required to monitor only those us-
112. Hardy, supra note 106, at 1051.
113. "No single organization controls any membership in the Web, nor is there any sin-
gle centralized point from which individual Web sites or services can be blocked from the
Web." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
114. A case that further undermines Hardy's proposal is GTE Media Services Inc. v.
Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The Court found that personal jurisdiction
could not be based solely on the ability of District residents to access the defendant's web
site. Id. at 1345. The defendants must be inhabitants of, transact business in, or be found in
the District for the court to have personal jurisdiction. Therefore, a plaintiff in the District of
Columbia must supplement its jurisdictional allegations against a remailer in another state
through discovery. Discovery against a remailer who does not keep records may prove futile.
115. "[S]uch technology is already creating problems for the legal system by making it
impossible to identify a responsible party when assessing civil or criminal liability." Levine,
supra note 19, at 1527.
116. Id. at 1541-42.
117. Id. at 1572.
118. Levine notes that "the present law governing the liability of anonymous remailers
... is confusing and uncertain .... [and] to the extent the law is discemable, it creates incen-
tives for administrators to either shut down their remailers or operate them irresponsibly."
[i.e., without keeping a list of true identities]. Id. at 1557.
119. Id. at 1561.
120. Id. at 1563. Levine envisions that "an incentive can be provided through a safe
harbor provision guaranteeing the remailer administrator protection from civil and criminal
liability when the administrator (1) has acted in good faith, and (2) voluntarily discloses to
the authorities the identity of a user engaging in illegal activities." Id.
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ers who are known to present a legal liability because of their past
acts."2 1
Although Levine's proposal is theoretically appealing," it will fail
in practice for several reasons. First, because a byproduct of Levine's
proposal is advocating the criminalization of remailers who do not keep
true identity records, the natural result of implementation of his program
will be remailer flight from jurisdiction." As discussed above with re-
spect to Professor Hardy's proposal, very little can be done to prevent or
address such flight.
Second, like Professor Hardy, Levine fails to recognize that even if
all of the anonymous remailers on earth could somehow be controlled,
the problem of anonymous cyberspace communication abuse would still
not be solved-there are other ways to send an anonymous message.
However, as Levine correctly notes, a change in the legal treatment of
anonymous remailers in the United States could have an effect on the
protocol of accepted cyberspace behavior of foreign remailers. 12
Levine asserts that his proposal would pass constitutional scru-
tiny,"z and it is likely that this is correct, because it promotes pseudo-
anonymous remailers and does not bar all truly anonymous communi-
cation. Therefore, his proposal might be worth attempting.
What can be done to realistically combat anonymity abuses in cy-
berspace? Perhaps very little. However, there may be an approach that
offers a more realistic solution than Professor Hardy's proposal, prom-
ises to be more effective than Levine's proposal, and offers more
legislative direction than the Attorney General's report. For crime-
fighting purposes, the government can criminalize most true cyberspace
anonymity, forcing all non-privileged messages to become pseudo-
anonymous, without violating the First Amendment.
121. Id. at 1560.
122. According to R. H. Coase, "A regulation need not be absolutely effective to be
sufficiently effective." See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. Rv.
1403, 1405 (1996).
123. Levine incorrectly concludes that "it is highly unlikely that the significant number
of domestic remailer administrators would change their country of residence just to be able
to continue running their own remailers free from regulation." Levine, supra note 19, at
1564. Levine fails to account for the strong motivations of remailer administrators that he
noted earlier in his comment: "[Miost remailer administrators are ... motivated by either an
interest in having the service available for their personal use or a deep-seated belief in the
virtues of anonymity." Id. at 1533.
124. Id. at 1564.
125. Id. at 1542.
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B. Argument
This comment proposes that, for the express purpose of targeting
non-desirable forms of anonymous communication, legislatures can
criminalize all non-privileged, truly anonymous communication in cy-
berspace, and mandate that all anonymous communication in
cyberspace be merely pseudo-anonymous.
State and federal governments have attempted to regulate cyber-
space anonymity in the past, but their proposals have failed for various
reasons, such as the legislation being over-broad and infringing on First
Amendment protections of freedom of speech.'2 Legislatures may draft
a constitutional regulation of anonymous speech by: (1) narrowly tai-
loring legislation to target specific crimes; and (2) enabling use of
specific technology to ensure that the legislation only affects the tar-
geted crimes. 27
Given the unique nature of cyberspace, the first requirement is al-
ready necessary, and both requirements are possible.1" Although it will
remain forever impossible to eradicate all abusive, truly anonymous
communication, both in and out of cyberspace, this proposal is a realis-
tic legislative remedy that will decrease cyberspace anonymity abuses
worldwide and pass First Amendment scrutiny.
First, for anti-anonymity legislation to succeed, it must narrowly
target specific evils. Governments must recognize that within the dis-
tinction between true anonymity and pseudo-anonymity lies the key to
legislative restrictions that can pass First Amendment scrutiny. Because
some types of true anonymity, such as political speech, are considered
valuable and necessary elements of society,29 the legislation cannot
merely target all true anonymity under the assumption that its existence
promotes anonymous criminal acts. Legislatures must isolate and target
only non-protected truly anonymous speech in cyberspace, such as cy-
126. See supra Part i.
127. For example, the Supreme Court rejected one legislature's argument that its statute
"aimed at providing a way to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising and libel"
because "nothing in the text or legislative history of the ordinance limited its application to
those evils." McIntyre v. Ohio Electronics Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1995) (quoting Tal-
ley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)).
128. As stated above, legislatures will never be able to end all truly anonymous com-
munication. Regardless of this fact, statutes criminalizing anonymity must only affect
targeted crimes, or they will be struck down by the courts as over-broad. Proper use of tech-
nology can insure that narrowly tailored anti-anonymity statutes have only the intended
effect.
129. Political speech, crime witnesses, novelists, whistle blowers, and Federalist Paper
authors are among the socially valued and protected beneficiaries of truly anonymous com-
munication.
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berstalking, child pornography, or libel.' The necessary tools to nar-
rowly tailor such legislation for the vast reaches of cyberspace are
outlined below.
Second, because technology controls cyberspace, the government
must address the technology. While this seems like an obvious point, it
is actually quite controversial.' The present architecture of cyberspace
only fuels the debate.'32 Regardless of the present state of cyberspace,
governments can already effect change through technology.
The government must: (A) give away free computer software33 and
take other stepsM to make pseudo-anonymous communication an at-
tractive, viable alternative to truly anonymous communication; and
(B) respect people's cloaked identities.' Indeed, the unmasking of an
130. See generally Walter Pincus, The Internet Paradox: Libel, Slander & the First
Anzendnent in Cyberspace, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 279 (1999).
131. David Johnson and David Post assert that "efforts to control the flow of electronic
information across physical borders ... are likely to prove futile." Johnson & Post, supra
note 9, at 1372. On the other hand, Lessig proclaims that "Code (as in software) is an effi-
cient means of regulation." Lessig, supra note 122, at 1408.
132. "Just now the architecture of cyberspace is quite imperfect. Indeed, what is central
about its present architecture is the anarchy that it preserve.... but this anarchy is just a
consequence of the present design. In its present design, cyberspace is open, and uncon-
trolled; regulation is achieved through social forces much like the social forms that regulate
real space... It could be made different, and my sense is that it is. The present architecture
of cyberspace is changing." See Lessig, supra note 122, at 1408.
133. The failure of government-created computer programs may raise yet-unanswered
problems. See Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet
Security, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 213, 245 (1995) ("Many questions arise in trying to apply neg-
ligence theory to an Internet security breach caused by a failed security device.").
134. Devices that access cyberspace, including computers, web phones, Web TVs, and
Global Positioning System units, are typically assigned an identifier known as an IP address.
Since there are a limited number of potential addresses, devices that "dial-up" cyberspace
are often assigned "dynamic addresses" that are reassigned to other devices at the end of a
call, allowing the address to be used more efficiently. It is difficult to track the users of these
devices because their addresses change from call to call or day to day.
A revised addressing scheme vastly increases the number of potential addresses, and the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) will soon decide whether dynamic address assign-
ments should persist for much longer periods of time. See Macavinta, supra note 32. If this
occurs, each device will essentially have its own virtual license plate, and all communica-
tions stemming from a device will be easily associated with its users. A program that cloaks
the sender's IP address via a PGP-like encryption technology would enable truly anonymous
communication. However, if a neutral body held the encryption key, the communication
would become pseudo-anonymous because the true identity of the user could ultimately be
discovered.
135. This second requirement may lead to a new (fairly ironic) problem: the theory that
rational governments are likely to increase their eavesdropping activities as technological
advances make eavesdropping easier. See Karl, supra note 16, at 530 n.176; see also A.
Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key; Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Con-
stitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 804-05 (1995) (asserting that rational governments are
likely to increase their eavesdropping activities as technological advances make eavesdrop-
ping easier).
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individual using this technology would be possible only after meeting a
very high standard, such as a warrant issued by a judge.'36 While this
solution may sound far fetched, it is technologically feasible and within
the power of the United States. Additionally, it likely would pass con-
stitutional scrutiny because it provides a level of pseudo-anonymity that
approaches true anonymity in its ability to cloak the sender's identity,
while eliminating the problems associated with truly anonymous com-
munication.
To increase the effectiveness of this proposal, legislatures would
have to take additional steps, but these steps are not crucial to the con-
stitutional viability of this proposal. For example, legislation that forced
email service providers to keep logs and verify the identities of their
users, 37 combined with legislation that forced local libraries and side-
walk cyberspace cafes to register the identities of people using their
computers, would decrease people's ability to send truly anonymous
communication.1 38 There may even be an attractive alternative to
Levine's proposal for anonymous remailers: instead of keeping records
of sender names, remailers could simply allow the encrypted IP address
of the message sender to pass through unmodified.' 39 This would enable
message senders to comply with the anti-anonymity legislation while
sending messages that are close to truly anonymous.
This proposal is akin to everyone driving with an encrypted license
plate, identifiable only with good cause. Opponents complain that the
anonymity police would pull people over too often, but access to peo-
ple's identities would remain in a safe place, accessible only with a
proper warrant.' 4 These ideas are not new; identity discovery policies
are already in effect with other kinds of communication, such as wiretap
136. See Karl, supra note 16 at 530 ("The United States Supreme Court consistently
has held that the government may not inquire into a person's private associations.")
(Footnote omitted).
137. Internet service providers are asked to keep logs so that if they are attacked,
authorities can use the information to help track down the hackers. Joe Wilcox, Reno Vows
Fed Help in Combating Net Vandalism, CNET News.com (Feb. 9, 2000), available at http://
news.cnet.com/news/10-1005-200-1546086.html?tag=st.cn.sr.ne.1 (on file with MTLR).
138. As Ron Dick, chief of the FBI's computer investigation section explained, "Until
you get to the keyboard being utilized [by an anonymous message sender], you don't know
what you're dealing with." In other words, even if the sender's computer can be identified,
the sender herself may remain anonymous. Biggest Cyberattack Was Simple, NYTimes.com
(Feb. 9, 2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com (on file with MTrLR).
139. As always, Hackers will be able to bypass this system and use the remailers to
send truly anonymous messages. However, this does not affect my proposal because "what
hackers do doesn't define what the effect of law as [a] code is on the balance of the non-
hacker public." Lessig, supra note 122, at 1408 n.17.
140. Although this statement assumes trust in the United States government, this pro-
posal does not require people to trust the government any more or less than the average
citizen does during the course of a day.
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and mail read warrants. This policy will not stop all true anonymity, 4'
but because it provides for powerful and socially beneficial pseudo-
anonymity, it should pass First Amendment muster. And if for political
or other socially acceptable reasons, someone needs to send a truly
anonymous, constitutionally protected communication through an
anonymous remailer that does not keep records, it will remain easy for
them to do: just turn off the IP address encryption program and press
<SEND>.
CONCLUSION
Despite the impact of high-profile e-commerce attacks, and despite
the Justice Department's request for more funds to fight cyber crime,'42
former President Clinton wanted to ensure that the Internet remains
"open and free."'43 In July, 1997, Ira Magaziner (then a senior White
House policy advisor), declared that because of the "breakneck speed of
change in technology, ... Government attempts to regulate [the Inter-
net] are likely to be outmoded by the time they are finally enacted."'"
This sentiment remains true, but that has not kept legislators from trying
to control cyberspace.
Because cyberspace enables truly anonymous communication to
flourish on a scale never before experienced, its existence promotes
anonymous criminal acts. As the influence of cyberspace increases in
society, these acts will only become more prevalent. 45 Although no one
141. Criminals who want to communicate anonymously will find a way to do so, re-
gardless of legislation.
142. "Growing concern over the increased threat of cyber crime has prompted the Jus-
tice Department to request another $37 million next year on top of the estimated $100
million already being spent to combat increasingly sophisticated computer criminals." Jus-
tice Department Wants More Funds to Fight Cyber Crime, CNN.com (Feb. 9, 2000),
available at http://vww.cnn.com/2000USl02109/cyber.crime.money/index.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 200 1)(on file with MTrLR).
143. "President Clinton met in the White House Cabinet Room with about 20 industry
representatives, national security experts and Attorney General Janet Reno. He said the goal
of the meeting was to ensure that the Internet remains 'open and free."' See Web Security,
supra note 8.
The President does not, however, want to ensure that the hackers remain free. According
to Attorney General Reno, the government is "committed in every way possible to tracking
down those who are responsible." Wilcox, supra note 137. Reno explained that the F.B.I.
will mobilize massive resources to try to hunt down and prosecute the attackers in coopera-
tion with federal, state and local law enforcement, government and private sector computer
experts, the intelligence community, and military experts. Id.
144. Lohr, supra note 54 (alteration in the original).
145. Michael Vatis, director of the National Infrastructure Protection Center, told the
Senate Judiciary Committee that the main difficulty in catching cybercriminals is determin-
ing where and how the crime was committed. Troy Wolverton & Greg Sandoval, Net Crime
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can stop a determined person from sending a truly anonymous elec-
tronic message, letter, or phone call, authorities can attempt to catch the
criminals who do,'16 and legislatures can take preventive action so that it
does not happen again. Educated legislators can criminalize most true
anonymity in cyberspace and still pass constitutional scrutiny, as long as
they provide viable and realistic alternatives for anonymous communi-
cation. The pseudo-anonymity requirements proposed by this comment
fight crime, and at the same time provide people with enough anonym-
ity for their communications to pass First Amendment scrutiny and
promote the ideals of democracy.
Poses Challenge to Authorities, CNET News.com (Oct. 12, 1999), available at
http://new.cnet.comlnews/0-3834-200-850601.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2001)(on file with
MTTLR). Vatis says he, "expect[s] to see an increase in hacking by organized crime as the
new frontier for large scale theft." David Kennedy, director of research services for Isca.net,
a security company that advises Internet companies on how to improve their security, be-
lieves that "things will get worse before they get better." Id.
146. Steve Lohr, writer for the New York Times, notes that the FBI, Justice Department
and FTC are "increasing their computer crime and Internet fraud squads" and that "the issue
appears to be mainly one of enforcement, not the need for new laws or policies." Lohr, supra
note 54.
The FBI recently unveiled a computer system called "Carnivore" that acts as a tradi-
tional phone tap for internet communications. Given the identity of an individual and access
to that individual's ISP, and given proper legal authorization, the FBI can use Carnivore to
examine all of the packets crossing the ISP's network and capture investigated communica-
tions. Aside from the problem of actually identifying who to look for and where to look, U.S.
Representative Charles Canady, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's Constitution
panel stated that "Carnivore raises the question as to whether existing statutes protecting
citizens from 'unreasonable searches and seizures' under the Fourth Amendment appropri-
ately balance the concerns of law enforcement and privacy." FBI Defends Email Scanner to
House Probe, CNET News.com (July 25, 2000), available at http:llnew.cnet.comlnewsl0-
1005-200-2339615.html (on file with MTLR).
To top off the issue, Troy Wolverton and Greg Sandoval, staff writers for CNET
News.com, say that "although crime might pay, combating it usually doesn't" because
"[m]ost online fraud cases involve amounts small enough that authorities often won't inves-
tigate." They explain that "[liaw enforcement officials have been scrambling to catch up
with these kinds of criminals-hobbled by insufficient resources and a flurry of trained in-
vestigators leaving for the private sector." Wolverton & Sandoval, supra note 145. Doug
Rehman, president of the Florida Association of Computer Crime Investigators agreed:
"Unfortunately I don't think that you're going to see law enforcement catch up with the
curve. In many ways, it's easier to commit crimes in cyberspace than in the real world." Id.
